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•	 The	most	 important	consequences	of	 the	 failed	coup	 include	
the	 consolidation	 of	 power	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 President	 Recep	
Tayyip	Erdoğan,	the	mobilisation	of	the	section	of	society	who	
support	him	and	the	crystallisation	of	the	canon	of	values	fun-




•	 The	 political	 myth	 of	 2016	marks	 the	 end	 of	 pragmatically	
drawing	 upon	 a	 broad	 spectrum	 of	 ideas	 because	 it	 defines	
a	precise	canon	of	values	 for	 the	New	Turkey.	 Its	pillars	are	
both	 the	 ideas	 that	became	widespread	under	AKP	rule	and	




















































since	2002.	This	paper	 is	an	attempt	 to	reconstruct	 its	 ideologi-






The	 interpretation	of	 the	modern	political	myth	 is	based	on	 the	
classical	work	of	Ernst	Cassirer	who,	starting	from	the	definition	
of	 the	myth	 as	 a	 “collective	 desire	 personified”,	 claims	 that	 the	
myth	is	an	emotion	turned	into	an	image.	In	addition	to	this,	the	
most	essential	feature	of	such	modern	political	myths	is	the	fact	
that	 they	are	 elaborated	by	 leaders	who,	 as	part	 of	 their	moves	
aimed	at	determining	the	character	and	identity	of	the	state,	com-
bine	elements	of	emotional	and	irrational	thinking	with	the	skill	




ernment,	 equipped	with	 the	myth	 of	 the	 coup,	 has	 consciously	
capitalised	on	the	real	emotions	and	trauma	of	citizens	over	the	
past	year	to	establish	a	canonical	story	of	the	New	Turkey.	
This	 text	discusses:	 the	 ideological	 aspect	of	AKP	rule	 in	2002–






































I. The AKP’s rule As A reconsTrucTIon 
of KemAlIsT TurKey 





















key	 (which	 is	 still	underway).3	This	 reconstruction	has	brought	
such	 fundamental	 changes	 as	 the	 disassembly	 of	 the	 Kemalist	







































ish	 nation	 as	 a	 secular	 ethnic	 community	 linked	 with	 the	 state4	
with	 a	more	 capacious,	 civic	 concept	 where	 the	 binding	 factor	 is	
































Changes	 in	 the	 institutional	 order	 of	 the	 republic	 were	 being	


















co-operation	 with	 the	 Nationalist	 Movement	 Party	 (Milliyetçi	
Hareket	Partisi –	MHP),	to	form	the	parliamentary	quorum7	and	
in	the	end	to	elect	Gül.	This,	in	turn,	opened	the	way	to	holding	














































































































































that	 has	 been	 taking	 place	 in	 the	New	 Turkey	which	 has	 been	
in	 formation	 since	 2002	can	 be	 recognised	 as	 revolutionary	 (in	
terms	of	the	depth	of	the	changes	and	not	their	suddenness).	The	















conducted	 on	 an	 unprecedented	 scale.13	 In	 turn,	 on	 the	 ideologi-
cal	level,	the	coup	made	it	possible	to	combine	into	one	consistent	
story	the	ideas	the	AKP	had	thus	far	been	juggling	by	pursuing	its	


























The fethullah Gülen movement (cemaat) 
A movement centred around the Turkish spiritual leader 
Fethullah Gülen (born in 1941). It has no official structure but 
operates in a coordinated manner. The movement’s operation 
extends to such areas as: education (until 2016, Cemaat’s edu-
cation facilities were located in over 180 countries), business 
(it has owned banks and entire holdings, including companies 
controlling entities operating in the media sector) and politics. 
The beginnings of the movement date back to the 1970s and 
1980s. Cemaat is a movement of a religious and social char-
acter. It calls for a religious and moral revival and also toler-
ance, dialogue between religions, the market economy and 
liberal democracy. Its operation in Turkey was aimed above all 
at educating modern Muslim elites that would be politically, 
socially and economically active, and capable of transforming 
the Turkish republic. In 2002–2013, the movement operated in 
close alliance with the AKP. Its members worked for the state 
apparatus (government agencies, the judiciary, structures 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Prosecutors and judges 
linked to Cemaat conducted the Ergenekon and Balyoz in 
close co-operation with the government (in 2008–2012) which 
ended up in dismissing or handing down lengthy prison sen-
tences to respectively 254 and 325 high-ranking military of-















the Supreme Court ruled that both of these had been show tri-
als and the evidence had been fabricated. 
An open conflict broke out between Cemaat and the AKP gov-
ernment in December 2013. The schism took place as a result 
of intensifying frustration inside the movement resulting 
from Erdoğan’s increasing dominance in the state. Prosecu-
tors linked to Gülen revealed a corruption scandal in which 
members of the cabinet which was then led by Erdoğan were 
involved. Corruption charges were also brought against the 
prime minister himself and his son. Since that time, the Turk-
ish government has been ruthlessly combating the movement 
(for example, in 2015 and at the beginning of 2016, two hold-
ings owned by Cemaat were placed into receivership, and the 
country’s largest daily, Zaman, was taken over). Shortly before 
the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, the general staff reportedly 
informed the government that hundreds of members of the 
officer corps had been identified as Gülen’s supporters. This 































II.  The couP ATTemPT As The foundInG 
myTh of The new TurKey 
1. A coup turned into a political myth
The	attempt	to	overthrow	Erdoğan’s	government	made	on	15	July	
2016	by	a	 section	of	 the	army	was	 the	most	 serious	upheaval	 in	
Turkish	 politics	 since	 the	 last	 coup	 in	 1980.	 The	 unsuccessful	
coup	 resulted	 in	 a	 sudden	 intensification	 of	 the	 political	 strug-
gle.	 In	 turn,	 the	 coup	 itself	 has	 provoked	 numerous	 controver-
sies.14	In	the	context	of	Turkey’s	transformation	under	the	AKP’s	

















































all	 the	 president)	 have	 direct	 contact	with	 their	 supporters.	 In	
this	manner	the	close	community	between	the	government	and	



















































but	at	 the	same	time	this	makes	 it	possible	 to	finally	determine	
what	the	order	being	built	is.	
2. The attempted coup of 15 July – the official version
The	official	version	of	 the	events	of	 15	July	2016,	 in	 factographic	
terms,	 does	not	 differ	much	 from	what	has	 been	 reconstructed	
on	the	basis	of	 independent	sources.	The	mythical	dimension	of	
the	 coup	and	 its	 failure	 is	manifested	 in	 the	official	 interpreta-
tion	 propagated	 by	 both	 the	 government	 in	 various	 statements	
and	the	pro-government	media.16	This	version,	elaborated	in	the	
weeks	 that	 directly	 followed	 the	 unsuccessful	 attempt	 to	 take	
over	power	has	become	entrenched	and	has	since	then	been	only	
slightly	corrected.	


























tions	 in	 Istanbul	and	Ankara,	 such	as	bridges	over	 the	Bospho-
rus,	Atatürk	Airport	 in	 Istanbul	 and	General	 Staff	buildings	 in	
Ankara.	The	airspace	of	Turkey’s	two	largest	cities	was	controlled	
by	units	of	 rebellious	air	 forces.	Additionally,	military	 facilities	
in	Ankara	and	intelligence	headquarters	were	attacked,	and	the	
chief	 of	 staff	was	 taken	hostage.	Around	midnight,	 the	plotters	




regularly	 and	 permanently	 violated	 under	 the	 present	 govern-
ment.	In	their	opinion,	AKP	rule	leads	to	an	escalating	erosion	of	



































possible	 owing	 to	 the	 dramatic	 address	made	 by	 the	 president	
via	mobile	phone	soon	after	his	escape	from	the	Marmaris	resort	
where	 he	was	 on	 holiday.20	 According	 to	 the	 official	 narrative,	
the	president	left	the	hotel	only	15	minutes	before	the	putschists	
who	 intended	 to	capture	him	were	 scheduled	 to	break	 into	 the	











As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 attempt	 to	 take	 over	 power,	 249	people	were	
killed	 and	 over	 2,000	were	 injured.	 The	 putschists	 also	 bom-
barded	 the	parliament	where	deputies	 from	all	political	parties	




























but	 also	 painstaking	 process	 of	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘passive	 revolution’.21	
The	change	happening	through	permanent	political	struggle	and	
the	social	and	economic	processes	that	have	taken	place	over	the	





sential	 in	 the	 context	 that	 interests	us	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 coup	
finally	discredited	the	enemy	and	equipped	the	government	with	
a	concrete	symbol	of	its	struggle	for	the	New	Turkey	and	the	abil-











































have	 been	 presented	 as	 the	 key	 and	 main	 proof	 that	 the	 coup	
was	 staged	 by	 the	 Gülen	 Movement.	 He	 admitted	 that	 he	 had	
met	members	of	the	movement	towards	the	end	of	the	1980s	and	
had	since	 then	been	supported	by	 them	on	subsequent	 levels	of	
his	military	career.	He	successfully	concealed	his	links	with	the	









The	 drama	 inherent	 in	 Erdoğan’s	 escape	 and	 his	 subsequent	
speech	broadcast	by	the	commercial	TV	station	CNN	Türk	is	espe-
cially	strongly	emphasised.	Combining	the	dramatic	story	of	the	
























is	an	undeniable	 triumph	of	both	 the	Turkish	nation	and	of	 the	
state	and	its	leader	which	are	closely	linked	to	the	nation.	The	na-












”On the hot night of 15 July,
The treacherous rebellion set the country on fire,
Then the whole nation stood up,
All families, old and young, took to the streets,
A blow to democracy was dealt, the nation was taken by surprise,
Since now liberty or humiliation!
The sound of millions of feet shook this place,
Hands holding the flags, mouths shouting takbir (‘God is great!’ – M. C.), they 
rushed ahead,
We are the witnesses of the epos of democracy!
We are the martyrs whose deaths raise from the dead another thousand!
The chief commander gave the order: Take to the streets!
Take the flags, defend the Holy Fatherland!
In the name of the love of the Nation, the Fatherland and God we stood eye to eye 
with death,
The whole world was dismayed seeing this,
The traitors sowing death from land and sky,
A multitude of souls faced death flying flags,
One lay his head in the path of a tank, another in front of a barrel,
Once again screaming in defence of democracy”






























ish	 triumphs	seen	 throughout	 the	entire	history	of	 the	Republic	
of	Turkey	and	the	Ottoman	Empire.	In	this	discourse,	15	July	is	to	
be	recognised	as	an	event	the	scale	and	heroism	of	which	matches	

































therland,	One	State’	(Turkish	Tek Millet, Tek Bayrak, Tek Vatan, Tek 
Devlet).	The	gesture	itself	appeared	in	Turkey	after	the	overthrow	
of	 the	 Egyptian	 government	 and	was	 used	 as	 a	manifestation	 of	
the	 Turkish	 government’s	 solidarity	 with	 the	 Muslim	 Brother-











The	new	order	 interpreted	 this	way	 is	 expected	 to	be	a	distinc-




Egypt	 is	 expected	 to	 show	 the	 inalterability	 of	 Ankara’s	 policy	




terpretation	where	 the	 four	 fingers	 signifying	 unity	 symbolise	
























is	 supposed	 to	make	 the	 republic	 governed	by	 the	AKP	distinct	
from	the	old	order	which	has	been	consistently	undergoing	disas-
sembly	by	the	party	and	its	leader	since	they	came	to	power.	The	
Islamic	 interpretation	 of	 Turkish	 identity	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 the	
main	binding	factor	for	the	heterogeneous	society	and	the	main	



























The	New	Turkey	has	no	 codified	 rules	 unlike	 the	 early	Kemalist	
Republic	whose	foundations	were	expressed	in	the	‘six	arrows’	of	
Kemalism.28	 ‘Improving’	the	Republic	per	se	is	nothing	new	–	the	











































1. The first pillar: the Nation
Since	the	beginning	of	its	rule,	the	AKP	has	demonstrated	an	am-
bivalent	 attitude	 towards	 the	Turkish	nation	 in	 its	Kemalist	 in-










century.	 Since	 that	 time,	 nationalism	 in	 Turkey	 has	 undergone	







































Since	 the	 coup,	 the	AKP	has	been	weaving	 in	and	out	of	 ethnic	
nationalism	 and	 its	 own	 version	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 national	
community.	 For	 example,	 Prime	 Minister	 Binali	 Yıldırım,	 to	










































an	 inclusive	 model	 of	 the	 nation.	 One	 clear	 example	 of	 these	



























































































highlighting	 the	elements	 that	allude	 to	 Islam.	 In	 the	discourse	
promoted	by	the	AKP,	the	category	of	‘sacred	nation’	(aziz millet),	
which	had	appeared	 in	 statements	of	AKP	politicians	 even	ear-






















there	 are	 plans	 to	 build	more	 of	 these	monuments.41	 However,	
this	initiative	met	with	opposition	from	members	of	the	Idealist	
Hearths	 (Ülkü Ocakları),	 the	youth	organisation	of	 the	National-





























stick	 to	 nationalist	 sentiments)	 and	 the	 government’s	 project	
treating	the	nation	as	a	combination	of	political	and	ethnic	iden-
tity	in	which	Islam	is	an	essential	element.43
The	 principle	 of	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 nation,	 which	 was	 an	
achievement	of	the	Kemalist	Republic,	plays	a	key	role	in	the	dia-
logue	between	 the	government	and	 the	public.	The	mass	 rallies	
of	national	unity	convened	immediately	after	the	attempted	coup	
were	held	under	the	slogan	‘Sovereignty	unconditionally	belongs	




































because	 it	 has	massive	 support.	 Taking	 over	 the	 strictly	modern	
concept,	as	the	principle	of	sovereignty	of	the	nation	is,	guarantees	
the	continuity	of	the	system	to	the	government	and	also	adds	cred-
ibility	to	the	project	being	implemented.	It	 is	 intended	that	 it	will	
maintain	 its	 republican	 character,	 however,	 with	 the	 difference	
that	in	the	official	narrative,	the	AKP	is	the	first	power	in	Turkey’s	
history	to	fully	implement	the	principle	of	sovereignty.	




above	 all,	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 ages	 of	 statehood	 tradition	 and	













The	state	 is	 strongly	 sacralised	 in	 the	Turkish	republican	 tradi-
tion.	This	was	already	visible	in	the	first	decades	of	the	republic’s	
existence,	when	it	was	being	proven	that	Turks	had	set	up	states	

















































































has	made	 an	 essential	 contribution	 to	 the	 history	 of	 humanity	
































self-reliance	 and	 isolationism,	 and	 replacing	 them	with	 expan-
sionism,	as	well	as	a	whole	array	of	ideas	that	were	born	in	Turkey	
in	the	late	19th	century	(echoes	of	pan-Islamism)	and	the	first	half	
of	 the	20th	 century	 (such	as	 references	 to	 the	War	of	 Independ-
ence	and	pan-Turkism)	and,	finally,	 anti-Westernism	shared	by	















of	Erdoğan	has	been	observed	 in	post-coup	Turkey;	 this	 is	done	
























April	 referendum	 envisages	 vesting	 the	 president	 with	 execu-
tive	power	and	in	fact	with	control	of	the	judiciary.50	Along	with	
a	 thorough	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 political	 system	which	means	
replacing	 the	 parliamentary-cabinet	 model	 with	 a	 presidential	
one,	 the	 formal	strengthening	of	Erdoğan’s	position	 in	 the	state	













































man	 army	who	waged	 holy	war	 against	 the	Western	 Christian	
occupiers.	He	has	also	made	a	whole	array	of	references	 to	spe-
cific	events	in	Kemal’s	biography	which	were	linked	to	the	crucial	
moments	 in	 the	history	of	 the	Republic	of	Turkey.	One	example	
may	be	the	 fact	 that	he	visited	Samsun	and	Erzurum	at	 the	be-


















Word	 of	 the	Truth’	 (Söz-ü Hakkı anlatan),	 ‘the	nightmare	 of	 the	































key	which	 the	AKP	used	 to	 combat	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 its	 rule	
(above	all,	 the	cult	of	Atatürk	which	 took	absurd	and	para-reli-
gious	forms).56	However,	it	 is	believed	to	mean	something	more.	
According	 to	 the	 commentator	 Fatih	 Yaşlı,	 the	 present	 cult	 of	
Erdoğan,	 along	with	 the	 presidential	 system	 being	 introduced,	
are	an	attempt	to	turn	into	reality	the	utopian	vision	of	the	‘State	































































narrative	 generated	 by	 the	 government.59	One	motif	 constantly	









































The	appeal	 for	 the	struggle	 for	a	better	 future	 is	principally	ex-
pressed	in	two	forms,	which	could	be	observed	during	the	cam-
paign	 preceding	 the	 April	 referendum.	 The	 first	 one	 involves	
frequently	 comparing	 the	 opponents	 of	 the	 presidential	 system	
to	PKK,	Islamic	State	and	the	Gülen	Movement,	which	AKP	poli-


























honours	its	heroes	(Tüm Şehitler ve Gaziler için),	and	the	last	lines	
“for	a	brighter	future,	for	children,	for	our	tomorrow,	all	togeth-
er	for	a	Powerful	Turkey!”	(Aydınlık bir gelecek için, Çocuklar için, 
Yarınlarımız için, Hep birlikte Güçlü Türkiye!)	were	sung	by	Prime	
Minister	Binali	Yıldırım’s	granddaughter.61	Thus	one	of	 the	cen-
tral	places	in	the	new	discourse	is	reserved	for	a	positive	message	















It	 includes	 statements	on	 the	 revolutionary	nature	of	 the	party	 and	 the	
continuing	construction	of	 the	new	order	which	 is	 to	begin	with	the	re-
newal	of	the	party	itself:	Cumhurbaşkanı	Erdoğan:	AK	Parti	devrimci	bir	
























The	victory	over	putschists	 in	 this	context	 is	 the	most	essential	
turning	point	in	the	construction	of	the	new	order	and	forms	its	






jority.	They	 are	 the	beneficiaries	 and	 co-authors	 of	 the	 changes	





















































From	 the	AKP’s	point	of	view,	 conflicts	 are	 inherent	 in	govern-
ing	Turkey.	This	boosts	 the	mobilisation	of	 the	government	and	
the	 public,	 and	 intensifies	 political	 dynamics.	 For	 this	 reason,	






More	 than	 fifty	 years	 since	 it	 joined	NATO	 (and	 two	 centuries	















finally	 to	be	distancing	 itself	 from	the	West,	which	 is	no	 longer	
a	point	of	reference	for	Turkey	in	the	areas	of	culture	and	politics.	
The	new	republic	is	replacing	liberal	democracy	with	a	sovereign	



























main	 enemies	 of	 the	New	Turkey	 include	 the	Gülen	Movement	
and	Islamic	State	which	draw	upon	Islam.	The	issue	of	citizenship	
for	 Syrian	 refugees	 has	 also	 been	 raised.	However,	 the	 govern-
ment	has	been	acting	cautiously	as	regards	 this	 issue,	above	all	
taking	into	account	the	interests	of	the	Turkish	public	who	have	
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been	clearly	voicing	their	views.	It	can	be	assumed	that	the	AKP	
will	not	take	any	actions	that	would	be	contrary	to	the	will	of	most	
ethnic	Turks,	but	will	rather	take	a	careful	‘pedagogical’	position	
to	soften	anti-Arab	resentments	and	prejudices	among	the	Turk-
ish	public.	
Mateusz Chudziak 
